Dangerous Misconceptions: Why COIN Still Matters in Modern Conflict

Why COIN Still Matters in Modern Conflict

War vs. Law Enforcement – A Misguided Paradigm in Irregular Conflicts, WHY COIN matters now more than ever.

War fought against insurgents and non-uniformed militants is not a police operation – yet U.S. political and military leaders often approached the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as if they were. Instead of treating insurgents as enemy combatants to be neutralized, officials imposed law enforcement-style rules of engagement and legal processes as though fighting crime at home. This symmetrical, legalistic framework – emphasizing arrest, evidence, and due process – was fundamentally incompatible with the ruthless reality of irregular warfare. In Iraq and Afghanistan, militants exploited these constraints at every turn, with deadly results. Decades of counterinsurgency experience teach that wars against guerrillas require ruthless but moral clarity about the use of force, not the transplanting of domestic courtroom norms onto the battlefield.

At its core, war is not about adjudicating guilt or innocence – it is about defeating an enemy. Battlefield commanders must make life-and-death decisions in seconds, often with incomplete information, to protect their troops and accomplish the mission. Imposing a law enforcement paradigm, by contrast, slows action with legal caution, demands levels of proof and restraint unsuited to combat, and treats insurgents as if they have the same rights as civilian criminal suspects. The U.S. learned this the hard way. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, well-intentioned efforts to apply domestic-style due process and legal norms to wartime situations not only hamstrung military operations but also emboldened insurgents who recognized and exploited American hesitation. As one analysis starkly concluded, “Our obsessive and dogmatic adherence to the rule of law, along with an excessive deference to individual rights at the expense of human security,” led to poorly conceived detention policies that released dangerous fighters to wreak havoc later.

Why did U.S. leaders fall into this trap? A major factor was a misreading of these conflicts as stabilization or policing missions rather than full-fledged wars. In the post-9/11 era, especially by the late 2000s, the U.S. government placed heavy emphasis on “rule of law” promotion and avoiding any appearance of brutality. Military lawyers were embedded at low levels to vet target decisions, and soldiers were trained to apply escalating force only as a last resort – much as a beat cop might do at home. The U.S. sought to win “hearts and minds” by demonstrating respect for legal norms and minimizing harm to civilians. While well-intentioned, this approach misunderstood the nature of irregular warfare: insurgents do not fight by the rules, and they interpret excessive American restraint as weakness. War against fanatic, non-uniformed insurgents – whether Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Taliban, or potential foes like Iran’s IRGC proxies – requires a mindset of fighting to win, not of policing a community. It requires ruthlessness in pursuing the enemy combined with moral clarity about protecting innocents – not legalistic symmetry or procedural perfection.

Strategic and Tactical Failures of a Legalistic Approach

Applying a law-enforcement framework to battlefield engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan led to tangible strategic and tactical failures. Time and again, U.S. and allied forces found that treating insurgents like ordinary criminals – with arrests, evidence collection, and trials – simply allowed the insurgency to persist or even strengthen. Several emblematic examples from the war zones illustrate how this approach proved ineffective and even dangerous:

• Catch-and-Release of Insurgents: In Iraq, U.S. forces initially tried to detain, prosecute, and rehabilitate insurgents in a quasi-judicial manner. The primary internment center, Camp Bucca, was run not just as a POW camp but almost like a corrections facility with an eye toward the eventual release of detainees. Detainees were guaranteed periodic due process reviews and other amenities; many were released after a year or two for lack of prosecutable evidence. The results were disastrous. An estimated 80% of Camp Bucca’s inmates were Sunni insurgents; by 2009, under legal and political pressure, the U.S. released thousands of them. Within a few years, those “released…prematurely” included numerous future ISIS leaders – militants who used their time in U.S. custody to network and plan. Indeed, analyses found that virtually all of the top 20 ISIS commanders in the mid-2010s had been detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq at some point. By prioritizing the legal process over strategic incapacitation of the enemy, the U.S. essentially educated and then freed the very men who would later lead a brutal insurgent army. One Iraq War veteran aptly termed this cycle “catch and release,” noting that an “excessive deference to individual rights at the expense of human security” meant many hardcore insurgents were cut loose without trial, only to resume violence. The insistence on courtroom-level evidence was ill-suited to a war zone – as one officer noted, “in Iraq, there was no ability to collect fingerprint or DNA evidence… [and] protection of witnesses was problematic or non-existent”, making civilian prosecutions nearly impossible. Rather than accept the wartime logic of holding dangerous fighters until the conflict’s end, the legalistic policy demanded their release if convictions could not be obtained. The outcome was predictable: insurgent networks replenished their ranks with U.S.-trained alumni of Camp Bucca, fueling years of further bloodshed.

  
  

• Rules of Engagement (ROE) that Favored Insurgents: On the battlefield, overly restrictive rules of engagement designed to mimic civilian policing gave insurgents a deadly edge. Under Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s counterinsurgency guidance in Afghanistan (circa 2009–2010), U.S. troops were forbidden from firing on Taliban fighters except under very limited circumstances if civilians might be at risk. Airstrikes, artillery, and even rifle fire were curtailed if there was any chance a non-combatant was nearby. Anyone not actively carrying a weapon was treated as a presumed civilian – a standard far stricter than the law of armed conflict requires. Taliban insurgents quickly “got savvy to the new rules” and exploited them. They would ambush a patrol with a burst of gunfire, then drop their weapons and flee into a crowded market or residential area, knowing U.S. forces could not shoot unarmed men or risk civilian casualties. NATO troops watched, frustrated, as enemy fighters literally ran away laughing – free to attack another day. This pattern played out repeatedly during the Afghan surge: insurgents learned that as long as they fired first and then discarded their arms, they were effectively immune from American fire. “Leaving your enemy intact is not a smart idea in any war,” observed combat veteran and author Bing West, lamenting that Taliban spotters and lookouts felt safe because they knew U.S. soldiers would not shoot them if they appeared unarmed. In one illustrative incident, a British sniper in Helmand Province actually fired a warning shot at a suspected Taliban spotter who was guiding enemy fire onto British troops – rather than kill him – because the man wasn’t holding a weapon at that split second. Not surprisingly, the startled spotter fled and likely returned to facilitate more attacks. Such hesitation, born of a hyper-legalistic ROE, gave the insurgents a perpetual tactical advantage. It also cost American lives: as ROE tightened in 2009, U.S. battlefield fatalities spiked sharply. The year 2010 became one of the deadliest for U.S. troops in Afghanistan, even as coalition-caused civilian casualties actually dropped by over 50% due to the restraints. In other words, Americans died in greater numbers while trying harder not to harm civilians – yet insurgent-caused civilian deaths continued to climb. The insurgency was not impressed by American restraint; if anything, the Taliban grew bolder, calculating that political pressure would ultimately push foreign forces out if they could inflict enough casualties without overstepping and causing a public outcry.

  
  

• “Mirandizing” Battlefield Detainees: Perhaps the most absurd manifestation of the law-enforcement mindset was the attempt to read insurgents their Miranda rights as if they were common arrestees. In mid-2009, reports emerged that U.S. personnel in Afghanistan – specifically FBI agents accompanying military units – were informing captured Taliban suspects of their right to remain silent and right to an attorney. This was ostensibly done “to preserve the quality of evidence obtained” for potential prosecution in U.S. courts. The reaction from soldiers and intelligence officers was swift and scathing. One U.S. Congressman on a fact-finding trip observed that reading Miranda rights to enemy fighters was “creating chaos among CIA, FBI, and military personnel” in the field, hampering their ability to gather crucial intelligence. Battlefield interrogations – a prime source of timely information to stop the next attack – were being chilled by fears that a failure to caution a terrorist about self-incrimination might jeopardize a future court case. The absurdity of this situation cannot be overstated: commandos risking their lives to nab a Taliban bomb-maker in a remote village had to pause so an agent could treat the prisoner like a U.S. criminal suspect. Although the Justice Department later insisted there was “no blanket policy” requiring Miranda warnings for detainees, it admitted that “specific cases” had seen this practice “to preserve…evidence” for prosecution. The mere fact that this occurred underscores how deeply the domestic legalistic framework had penetrated operations. Instead of prioritizing intelligence to win the war, the priority shifted to building legal cases – a triumph of process over purpose. The Taliban, needless to say, were not extending any such rights to captured Americans or Afghan civilians; those who fell into their hands met torture and summary execution, not lawyers.

  
  

• Halting Offensives Due to Legal/Political Pressure: The U.S. occasionally pulled punches or prematurely halted offensives under political/legal pressure, squandering hard-won advantages. A clear case was the First Battle of Fallujah in April 2004. After four American contractors were killed and mutilated by insurgents, U.S. Marines moved to assault the insurgent-held city of Fallujah. Within days, they had encircled much of the city and were pushing into militant enclaves. However, graphic media coverage of civilian casualties and outcry from the fledgling Iraqi Governing Council prompted Washington to abort the operation just as it gained momentum. On April 9, 2004, under intense political pressure, U.S. authorities unilaterally declared a ceasefire and suspended offensive operations in Fallujah. The Marines, who had lost men in the fighting, were aghast – they were ordered to pull back and negotiate with the very insurgent leaders orchestrating attacks. The ceasefire allowed hundreds of insurgents (including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s followers) to escape or reinforce, turning Fallujah into an even more entrenched bastion of jihadists. By the time negotiations failed and U.S. forces finally attacked again in November 2004, the enemy had transformed Fallujah into a fortress – requiring the Second Battle of Fallujah, the deadliest urban assault of the Iraq War, to root them out. In essence, excessive concern for legal and political optics in April – an unwillingness to see the fight through – led to a far bloodier battle in November. Over 90 American troops and an estimated 1,200–1,500 insurgents died in that second battle, and large sections of the city were destroyed. This illustrates how hesitation and half-measures, often driven by legalistic ROE and political constraints, can perversely increase the total harm and cost of war. A similar dynamic played out in Afghanistan when the U.S. often gave high-level insurgent leaders safe passage to “reconciliation” talks or forbade strikes on them in Pakistan due to legal concerns – only to find those leaders redoubling their efforts against coalition troops. In war, allowing an enemy sanctuary or respite in hopes of a tidy, negotiated outcome is usually wishful thinking.

  
  

In sum, the attempt to overlay a domestic law enforcement model onto overseas counterinsurgency produced perverse outcomes. Insurgents were treated as litigants rather than foes, given rights and releases that a traditional laws-of-war framework would not require. The enemy capitalized on every gap: freed fighters, restrictive ROEs, and procedural delays all became weapons for the insurgency. These failures highlight the central thesis: war is not won with lawyers and judges. While moral conduct in war is essential, conflating moral conduct with civilian due process is a profound error. In irregular warfare, decisive force, applied with discipline, saves more lives in the long run than protracted pseudo-policing that lets conflict fester.

The Counterinsurgency Doctrine Debate – From Legalism to Abandonment

The U.S. approach in Iraq and Afghanistan was heavily influenced by the contemporary Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, which itself contained contradictions on this issue. The COIN doctrine enshrined in the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 (2006) famously emphasized “winning hearts and minds” and securing the populace. This often translated into tactical directives to use minimum force and to mirror policing methods – population protection, community engagement, rule-of-law programs – rather than conventional search-and-destroy missions. Commanders like Gen. David Petraeus argued that adhering to the rule of law enhanced legitimacy and was “good counterinsurgency” because it bolstered the host government’s credibility. Indeed, U.S. forces invested heavily in building courts, training police, and instilling Western legal procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan. The logic was that a just legal system would address grievances and erode the insurgency’s appeal. Efforts to “promote the rule of law” became a pillar of the COIN campaign.

However, this theory met harsh realities on the ground. Both Iraq and Afghanistan lacked the institutional capacity and cultural foundations for Western-style justice amid war. As one Army JAG officer in Afghanistan observed, “Neither country’s legal system possesses the settled law and procedures…nor commands the respect…that [Western] legal systems do.” In Afghanistan, especially, formal courts barely functioned in rural areas; disputes were handled by tribal elders or not at all. Trying to impose Western legal standards in such an environment was quixotic. More importantly, insurgents do not pause their violence to allow nascent legal institutions to work – they actively undermine them. Taliban intimidation of judges, the assassination of prosecutors, and the populace’s fear of retribution for cooperating made rule-of-law efforts largely futile during the active conflict. The U.S. COIN doctrine’s lofty ideal of strengthening legal governance came up against the insurgency’s brutal strategy of terror, and the latter usually prevailed in the short term.

Over time, the evident lack of decisive success in Afghanistan and mixed results in Iraq led to a backlash against COIN doctrine. By the mid-2010s, many in the U.S. military grew disillusioned with population-centric COIN and its implied restraints. The pendulum began to swing: the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq (2011) and then Afghanistan (2021) saw a conscious shift away from counterinsurgency and back toward preparing for conventional warfare against peer adversaries. As one 2022 analysis put it, “The US Army has lost interest in counterinsurgency training… the withdrawal from Afghanistan appears to have drawn a line under COIN’s modern incarnation.” COIN and irregular warfare became “out of fashion”, somewhat tainted by association with the frustrations of Iraq and Afghanistan. In the wake of the Taliban’s return to power and Iraq’s turmoil (including the rise of ISIS), U.S. defense strategy documents – such as the 2018 National Defense Strategy – explicitly downgraded counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as priorities, instead refocusing on “inter-state strategic competition” (i.e. Russia and China).

This retreat from COIN was in some ways an understandable corrective, but it carries its own risks. History shows that after Vietnam, the U.S. military similarly purged its COIN knowledge and reverted to a conventional mindset – only to be caught unprepared for irregular wars in places like Lebanon, Somalia, and ultimately Iraq/Afghanistan. “The US military has been here before,” scholars Tripodi and Wiger note, recalling how the post-Vietnam focus on conventional war left the Army poorly equipped to advise on counterinsurgencies in the 1980s–90s. That neglect had “tragic ramifications for readiness and expertise” when insurgencies inevitably arose. Likewise, today’s heavy tilt toward big-power conflict could leave the U.S. stumbling when (not if) the next irregular conflict erupts. As strategist Steven Metz warns, “while the United States may be over COIN, COIN is not done with the United States.” Civil wars, insurgencies, and nonstate violence remain “consistent features of the international system” – they will not magically disappear because America prefers to fight tank battles or naval duels. The challenge moving forward is to learn from past COIN mistakes – including the dangers of over-legalizing warfare – without forgetting the hard-won lessons on how to fight insurgents when necessary.

Notably, even as the U.S. pivots to great-power competition, the Pentagon has acknowledged that irregular warfare will continue to be important. A 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy argued for institutionalizing IW capabilities, precisely so the military doesn’t lose its edge in advising partners, countering insurgencies, and waging unconventional campaigns in an era of global competition information. However, maintaining a balance is difficult. The worry is that an overcorrection is underway – that in rejecting the excessive caution and legalism of early 21st-century COIN, the U.S. might also discard the moral and strategic insights needed to wage irregular war effectively. As we prepare for potential conventional showdowns, we must remember that even those could spawn insurgencies: for instance, a war with Iran might quickly devolve into guerrilla warfare and proxy fights across the Middle East, terrain where law enforcement norms would once again be counterproductive.

The Risks of Ignoring the Irregular Warfare Reality

Focusing overwhelmingly on conventional warfighting and symmetrical “fair fights” is dangerous in a world where most adversaries will seek to fight asymmetrically. America’s high-tech military prowess – satellites, drones, precision weapons, networked command – gives it a conventional overmatch that few enemies will challenge head-on. Instead, they will turn to irregular tactics, terrorism, cyber and electronic attacks, and protracted insurgency to level the playing field. We have already seen this with insurgent groups and with states like Iran, which explicitly organize their forces for asymmetric warfare. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for example, “built its unique military doctrine around guerrilla and asymmetrical warfare, diverging sharply from the conventional tactics of Western militaries.”bruinpoliticalreview.org Rather than emulating U.S.-style large-scale operations, the IRGC emphasizes small, mobile units, hit-and-run attacks, and exploiting enemy weaknesses – exactly the style that vexed U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should conflict with Iran occur, we can expect swarms of fast attack boats, militias, and proxies attacking U.S. interests, and urban warfare in regional hotspots – not set-piece battles in the open desert. Preparing only for conventional force-on-force war would leave the U.S. poorly adapted to these tactics.

Moreover, a sobering lesson of modern conflict is that our technological superiority can be partly or wholly neutralized by certain conditions – whether by enemy action or environmental factors. If U.S. forces ever face a near-peer adversary, there is a high likelihood that high-tech systems will be degraded by electronic warfare, cyber-attacks, or even electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. A well-placed nuclear EMP blast, for instance, could knock out communications, sensors, and power grids, effectively “neutralizing the great technological advantage enjoyed by U.S. military forces.”congress.gov Indeed, a Congressional Commission warned that a nuclear EMP is “the perfect asymmetric weapon” for leveling the battlefield against the United States. If satellites go down, drones are jammed, and smart munitions fail – what remains is a battlefield that looks a lot like the “human, tribal, and urban terrain” where insurgents excel. At that point, all the fancy hardware is of little use; victory will depend on unit cohesion, willpower, local knowledge, and old-fashioned small-unit tactics in cities and villages. In other words, the fight reverts to the people– much as it did in Iraq when high-tech visions of a quick, networked war gave way to gritty counterinsurgency in alleyways and palm groves. An overly conventional mindset could leave U.S. forces psychologically unprepared for that shift. We must train and retain the ability to wage irregular war with the right balance of aggression and restraint, even as we field advanced weaponry.

Finally, irregular conflict remains dominant in many regions. From the Sahel in Africa to the jungles of Southeast Asia, insurgencies and guerrilla wars outnumber interstate wars. Great powers like Russia and China also engage in “hybrid” warfare that employs proxies, mercenaries, and political subversion (as seen in Ukraine, Syria, etc.). The United States cannot afford to ignore this reality. If we swing too far toward prepping only for big wars, we risk repeating the mistake of 2003, when we were brilliant at invading Iraq conventionally but utterly unready for the insurgency that followed. The human domain of war – dealing with populations, insurgents hiding among civilians, and winning the support of local allies – will remain the key to enduring success or failure in most conflicts. Thus, we must reject both extremes: neither a naive law-enforcement/courtroom approach nor an overly mechanistic conventional approach will serve us well. We need an approach that is pragmatic, flexible, and cognizant of war’s brutal nature without losing moral clarity.

Rebutting the Counterarguments: Law, Morality, and the “Hearts and Minds” Factor

Advocates of the law-enforcement-style, restrained approach are not without arguments. It is important to address their points, even as we ultimately find them unpersuasive in the context of irregular warfare:

Counterargument 1: “We must maintain humane standards and uphold the rule of law, even in war.”Indeed, western militaries rightly hold themselves to legal and ethical standards. The law of armed conflict (LOAC)and Geneva Conventions provide crucial protections for non-combatants and prevent wanton atrocities. Adhering to these laws is both morally right and strategically wise – the U.S. should never descend into the kind of barbarism practiced by groups like ISIS. Proponents argue that emphasizing due process and humane treatment strengthens our moral high ground and legitimacy. For example, one U.S. military legal advisor in Iraq/Afghanistan contended that “a conscious reliance upon law to defeat those…who scorn it happens to be good counterinsurgency” because it undercuts the enemy’s narrative and bolsters the host government’s authority. From this perspective, providing detainees with fair treatment and trials showcases the contrast between our values and the enemy’s, potentially winning moderate hearts and minds. It is also argued that abuses and brutality are counterproductive: every innocent killed or mistreated by U.S./coalition forces could drive relatives into the arms of the insurgency. This was the logic behind restricting firepower – to avoid alienating the populace through collateral damage. Historical examples are cited, such as how French excessive brutality in Algeria (e.g. systematic torture during the Battle of Algiers) eventually eroded domestic French support and fueled the Algerian nationalist cause, despite short-term tactical gains. Similarly, the Vietnam War showed that widespread destruction (e.g. My Lai massacre, heavy bombardments) tarnished America’s image and arguably hastened failure by losing the political war. Thus, the argument goes, maintaining humane, legalistic standards is essential for long-term strategic success in an insurgency.

Rebuttal: There is a clear distinction between honoring the law of war versus imposing domestic criminal procedure on the battlefield. The former is necessary and compatible with effective warfighting; the latter is not. The law of armed conflict does not require reading Miranda rights to enemies or having a trial to detain a fighter until hostilities conclude. It simply requires humane treatment of prisoners and proportional use of force. One can – and must – uphold LOAC (no torture, no intentional targeting of civilians, etc.) while still being a relentless combatant. Moral clarity in war means we fight ferociously but not wantonly. It means treating captured fighters humanely as POWs or security detainees but not automatically releasing them or giving them lawyers amid war. It means minimizing civilian casualties where feasible, but recognizing that the insurgents themselves create most of the danger to civilians and that protracted indecision can get more civilians killed in the long run. For example, in Afghanistan, coalition forces initially avoided aggressive action in certain Taliban havens to prevent civilian harm; the Taliban instead entrenched and eventually inflicted even greater suffering on those communities (a classic case of insurgents coercing civilians once they secured control). Had coalition forces cleared those areas earlier (with some risk and cost), the population might have been spared years of oppressive insurgent rule.

Legitimacy in the eyes of the populace is indeed crucial – but legitimacy comes from security and justice, not from legalistic gestures that do nothing to improve daily life. In Iraq, the locals ultimately supported the U.S. “Surge” in 2007-08 not because American troops suddenly adopted softer ROEs (quite the opposite; they went on the offensive) but because they drove out Al-Qaeda terrorists who were brutalizing Sunni communities. Security – an end to bombings, killings, and militia extortion – was the populace’s primary demand, more so than Western legal norms. Crucially, insurgents will always paint foreign forces as oppressors no matter how gently those forces behave. Restraint is interpreted as weakness; brutality is used for propaganda – the insurgent will twist any narrative. The best counter-narrative is success: if insurgents are seen as losing and unable to protect their collaborators, their mystique and recruitment suffer. This may be cold logic, but history suggests populations tend to side with the winner or at least the side that can guarantee basic security. Thus, being firm and effective, while scrupulously avoiding true atrocities, is more strategically sound than being overly cautious and ineffectual. The French in Algeria did undermine themselves with torture – a lesson that methods must retain moral clarity. But France’s failure was not because they fought too hard; it was because they crossed into barbarism and lost political legitimacy. A balance is key: ruthlessness toward the enemy within the bounds of LOAC, coupled with genuine care for civilians. We can, for instance, use overwhelming force to annihilate a confirmed insurgent safe-house, but also spend heavily on compensation and rebuilding for any civilians affected. What does not work is letting the insurgents operate freely to avoid any civilian damage – that simply cedes the field to an enemy with no such qualms.

Counterargument 2: “Public perception and global opinion demand a legalistic approach.”In modern conflicts, every action is under the microscope of international media, NGOs, and local populations with smartphones. Some argue that if the U.S. jettisons a due-process approach, it will face condemnation that undermines the war effort. Incidents like Abu Ghraib prison abuse in Iraq or the killings of civilians by rogue soldiers show how quickly the narrative can turn against the military. Therefore, a strict legal framework is seen as a safeguard against misconduct. By requiring evidence and higher authorization for strikes or detention, the military reduces the chance of mistakes that create public outrage. Additionally, allies and host-nation governments may politically require such measures – for instance, the Afghan government in later years insisted on reviewing evidence for detainees and pushed for releasing those not formally convicted. The U.S. could not simply ignore the sovereign host nation’s stance without damaging the partnership. So, proponents say we had no choice but to integrate legal processes into operations to maintain coalition cohesion and international legitimacy.

Rebuttal: It is true that perception matters – but outcomes matter more. If a war is failing, no amount of legal process will save public support for it. Conversely, if a war is clearly being won and bringing peace, the world is more forgiving of the tough measures taken to get there. For example, the Sri Lankan government faced much international criticism for its ruthless final offensive against the Tamil Tigers in 2009 (which involved significant civilian casualties), but the fact that they decisively ended a 25-year insurgency has since brought a measure of stability and even grudging acknowledgment that ending the war was a relief to most civilians. That said, the Sri Lanka model of outright disregard for civilian safety is not what we advocate – it lacked moral clarity and left a legacy of human rights issues. The point is that effectiveness weighs heavily in retrospective judgment. In Iraq, by contrast, the U.S. could boast of adherence to legal norms (to a degree), but the chaotic violence and eventual rise of ISIS overshadowed any goodwill earned by restraint. On the issue of host-nation demands: yes, by late stages the Iraqi and Afghan governments wanted control over detentions, which led to the release of dangerous prisoners for political reasons. These fledgling governments often lacked the will or ability to hold insurgents – or cynically saw releases as bargaining chips with the militants. Here the U.S. perhaps ceded too much for the appearance of Iraqi/Afghan sovereignty. Ultimately, a stronger position would have been to insist that serious threats be incapacitated until the conflict’s conclusion. Sovereignty is important, but not at the cost of mission failure – especially when U.S. lives are at stake. As for global opinion, the reality is that adversary propaganda will demonize counterinsurgency efforts regardless. If anything, insurgents often fabricate or exaggerate claims of civilian harm to fuel outrage. The best defense is transparency and quick investigation of incidents – mechanisms the U.S. military already has – not paralyzing our forces with red tape before they can act. In Afghanistan, despite extremely strict ROE under McChrystal, Taliban propaganda still accused U.S. forces of atrocities that never happened and every accidental bombing was blown up (sometimes literally) in media. The lesson is: to do everything feasible to minimize real civilian suffering, but accept that some will occur in war and must be forthrightly addressed, not avoided to the point of operational impotence. Public opinion can accept harsh realities if they are leading to a just end (witness how public anger at civilian deaths in World War II was tempered by the understanding that defeating Nazism and Japanese militarism necessitated total war). In insurgencies, the calculus is harder, but the principle stands – demonstrable progress toward victory and stability will ultimately sway perception more than performative compliance with legal processes.

Counterargument 3: “COIN is outdated; we should avoid these wars entirely or fight them with minimal footprint.”Some critics say the entire discussion is moot because the U.S. should refrain from large-scale counterinsurgency or nation-building campaigns in the first place. They argue that after Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. public has no appetite for trying to fix failed states or transform foreign societies – and that our focus should be on deterrence and high-end warfare. If irregular threats arise (terror cells, etc.), we can handle them with “over-the-horizon” strikes or by training local partners, rather than deploying big armies that get entangled in messy legal/ethical quagmires. Essentially, this view says: Don’t fight guerrilla wars – but if you must, use special ops and precise raids, and get out fast. By this logic, the question of law enforcement vs. war paradigm is sidestepped by avoiding protracted irregular wars altogether. Also, proponents note that times have changed – modern sensor and drone technology might allow us to target terrorists surgically without needing the heavy-handed tactics of past counterinsurgencies, thereby reducing civilian impact and obviating heavy legal frameworks or large deployments.

Rebuttal: It is certainly tempting to say “never again” to protracted COIN campaigns, but wars have a way of choosing us. We may not always have the luxury of avoiding insurgency environments, especially if they emerge from larger conflicts or threats to U.S. interests. The U.S. did not seek an insurgency in Iraq – it materialized out of the post-invasion vacuum. If a future conflict – say a collapse of a nuclear-armed state, or intervention to prevent genocide – leads to an insurgency, U.S. forces might again find themselves in stabilization roles. Moreover, near-peer competitors are likely to drag the U.S. into irregular fights indirectly: e.g., Russia’s operations in Eastern Europe or Syria involve a mix of conventional force and deniable irregular tactics, forcing the U.S. and allies to respond on multiple levels.

Counterterrorism also remains a long-term task; purely remote methods (drones, missiles) have limits – they kill terrorists but cannot stabilize territory or win the allegiance of populations. We learned that drone strikes can decapitate networks, but those networks often regenerate unless a comprehensive approach secures the ground. That often means working with and protecting local communities – classic COIN themes. Thus, we must keep COIN in the toolkit, while being far more realistic about its challenges. If we do end up in another COIN, we should not repeat the exact approach of the 2000s. A smarter COIN would likely be smaller, emphasize supporting local forces (who often can be less constrained), and set more modest goals. But even then, the fundamental truth remains: someone has to fight the insurgents on the ground. Whether it’s U.S. Rangers or an African partner battalion, they will face the dilemmas of irregular war. And if those forces are hobbled by an overdose of legalisms, the insurgents will prevail.

Therefore, the necessity of an effective warfighting mindset – even within a “light footprint” strategy – is undiminished. As for technology making war neater: the fog of war is eternal. Drones can surveil but also produce mistakes (as tragically seen when a U.S. drone strike in Kabul in August 2021 mistakenly killed 10 civilians, thinking them terrorists). High-tech tools augment but do not replace the need for human judgment and aggressive initiative in war. We cannot drone-strike our way to victory in a large insurgency without any boots on the ground; ISIS was only rolled back in Iraq when U.S. airpower was paired with Iraqi infantry retaking cities street by street – brutal, costly work that looked more World War II than Star Wars. In those gritty moments, what wins is the will to close with and destroy the enemy, not a legal brief.

Ruthless, Not Reckless: The Case for Moral Clarity in Unconventional War

Having dissected the missteps of the law enforcement paradigm and addressed opposing views, we return to the core principle: war – especially irregular war – demands ruthless but moral clarity. This phrase encapsulates a balance. “Ruthless” means our forces must be utterly determined and free to use decisive force against those who take up arms against us. It means not allowing the enemy an advantage through our hesitation. If a sniper is in a mosque minaret firing on our troops, ruthlessness says we take him out – mosque or no mosque (the enemy already defiled it by using it as a fighting position). If a terrorist leader is meeting in a compound full of armed men, we do not give him a pass because he’s not formally “indicted” – we strike. If capturing a bomb maker risks our soldiers’ lives, we neutralize him from afar rather than reading him rights in hopes of a trial. In essence, ruthlessness is about keeping our eyes on the objective: winning the conflict by eliminating the hostile threat as efficiently as possible.

Yet ruthlessness must be paired with moral clarity. We do not advocate war without constraint or conscience. Moral clarity means understanding why we fight and what lines we will not cross, even in desperation. It means recognizing civilians as sacred non-combatants and making sincere efforts to spare them, not because of legal checklists, but because of our values. It means treating captives humanely – no torture, no vengeance – because we are not criminals and because such abuse often backfires strategically. Moral clarity also involves transparency about our actions and accountability for our mistakes. In practice, an approach guided by moral clarity might resemble the early American posture in Fallujah’s second battle: before the assault, civilians were urged to evacuate, and many did; once the battle was joined, U.S. forces fought ferociously, using every tool (airstrikes, armor, infantry) to crush the insurgents who remained. That operation was ruthless – Fallujah was devastated – but it was driven by a clear moral rationale: to eradicate a barbaric enemy that was killing Iraqis and Americans alike, and to restore order to a city taken hostage. The moral clarity was evident in Marines risking their lives to minimize harm to noncombatants (for instance, repeatedly clearing buildings room-by-room rather than calling airstrikes on every structure). In the aftermath, the U.S. helped rebuild Fallujah and compensated residents, reflecting the moral responsibility to rebuild what war’s necessity destroyed. Critics still debate Fallujah, but it stands as an example of a difficult operation where a hard fight was not shirked, and ultimately the insurgent hold on the city was broken.

Moving forward, U.S. military and policymakers must shed the illusion that war can be engineered to resemble a peacetime courtroom or a police precinct. Wars are won by defeating the enemy’s will and capacity to fight, not by issuing warrants and holding trials in absentia. Insurgents typically operate outside the law by definition – trying to legally constrain ourselves into pretzels in hopes of some reciprocal civility is naive. As a seasoned British general once quipped about fighting the IRA, “If you fight with one hand tied behind your back, don’t be surprised when all you feel is the other fellow’s fist.” We must untie that hand – within the bounds of honor. That means empowering our troops with clear, aggressive rules of engagement that prioritize mission success, while also training them in ethical decision-making and cultural awareness to exercise lethal force judiciously. It means streamlining detention policies to allow swift removal of combatants from the battlefield for the duration of the conflict, with periodic reviews for legitimacy but not requiring CSI-style evidence gathering in the middle of combat. It means accepting that some level of collateral damage and civilian hardship is unavoidable in war – and being prepared to address it and explain it, rather than futilely trying to legislate it out of existence through restrictive directives.

The consequences of not embracing this balanced framework are stark. As detailed, the law-enforcement approach in Iraq and Afghanistan prolonged those wars and arguably helped doom their outcomes. The Taliban was never truly defeated; they were effectively allowed to bide their time, as U.S. and NATO forces operated under ever-tightening constraints that the insurgents exploited until the Western public grew weary and left. In Iraq, an argument can be made that the overly legalistic handling of insurgency between 2003–2011 sowed the seeds for the later collapse of Iraqi security – by 2014, large swathes of Iraq fell to ISIS, led by men we had caught and let go. If “ruthless but moral” warfighting had been applied consistently from the start – ruthless in not letting nascent insurgencies take root or key militants escape, moral in simultaneously protecting civilians and not abusing our power – the trajectory might have been different. We might have achieved a more stable equilibrium or at least not empowered an even more virulent enemy down the line.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, war is a brutal contest of wills, not a legal seminar. The U.S. Armed Forces and political leadership must recognize that attempting to fight insurgencies with a peacetime, law-enforcement mindset is a recipe for failure. This does not mean discarding our values or the rule of law; it means applying the appropriate law – the law of armed conflict – and the appropriate mindset – that of a warrior, not a police officer – when engaged in war. We must remember the hypothesis with which we began: U.S. leaders misunderstood the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan by shackling themselves with rules and legalistic constraints ill-suited to irregular warfare. The evidence, from catch-and-release detainee policies to insurgent exploitation of restrictive ROEs, bears this out. Those conflicts demanded a more unfettered approach to neutralizing enemies, one that could have shortened the violence and spared many lives on all sides by bringing the wars to a quicker conclusion. Instead, the drawn-out, half-measures approach extended the suffering and ultimately led to strategic defeat in Afghanistan and a tenuous peace in Iraq.

As we prepare for future threats, including potential confrontations with state adversaries who will undoubtedly use irregular tactics, we must embed these lessons in our doctrine and culture. A pivot back to purely conventional warfighting would be shortsighted; irregular warfare remains the enduring substrate of global conflict. By all means, the U.S. should strive to avoid large-scale counterinsurgency quagmires. But it should do so from a position of strength – deterring enemies by convincing them that if an insurgency is necessary to achieve U.S. aims, we will fight it decisively and prevail. That conviction itself can be a deterrent; if adversaries know we will not be hamstrung by self-imposed legal fetters, they may be less inclined to sponsor the kind of protracted irregular wars that bleed us.

In conclusion, the U.S. must forge a doctrine for irregular warfare that eschews law enforcement-style rigidity and instead empowers commanders and troops to use decisive force with moral discretion. This means training leaders who understand both the importance of aggressive action and the importance of ethical conduct – and who can intelligently balance the two under extreme conditions. It means educating policymakers that war cannot be made risk-free or mistake-free through bureaucratic controls; war is inherently chaotic and bloody, and trying to tame it with courtroom rules is folly. Above all, it requires a cultural shift: we must stop apologizing for seeking victory. In arenas like Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces at times acted as if their primary goal was to avoid offense – to avoid a scandal, a civilian casualty, a diplomatic incident – rather than to win swiftly. But victory – in the form of a stable peace on our terms – is ultimately the surest way to end human suffering in war. With insurgents vanquished, the law-abiding majority can finally live without fear.

The charge for today’s and tomorrow’s military and policy leaders is to have the courage and clarity to fight wars as wars, not as police operations. That means unleashing our strength when we must while remaining true to the fundamental values that distinguish us from our ruthless enemies. It is a difficult balance, but not an impossible one. The men and women on the front lines deserve a strategy that sets them up to win, not one that constrains them into a stalemate. A ruthless but moral approach to unconventional warfare offers that path. It tells our troops: We trust you to fight fiercely and honorably. It tells our enemies: We will not play by your twisted rules – we will defeat you. And it tells the world: America will do what it takes to secure peace, without sacrificing the justice and humanity that peace is meant to serve.

References

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• Whiteside, C. (2014, December 18). Catch and Release in the Land of Two Rivers. War on the Rocks. Retrieved from warontherocks.com

• Salahuddin, S., & Londoño, E. (2014, February 13). Afghanistan frees suspected Taliban prisoners over U.S. objections. The Washington Post. Retrieved from washingtonpost.com

• Metz, S. (2021, July 28). Not Your Grandfather’s Counterinsurgency: Radically New Forms of Nonstate Violence. Modern War Institute at West Point. Retrieved from mwi.usma.edu

• Tripodi, C., & Wiger, M. (2022, July 26). Worthless COIN: Why the West Should Keep Studying Counterinsurgency. Irregular Warfare Initiative. Retrieved from irregularwarfare.org

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• U.S. House of Representatives. (2014). Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Threat to Critical Infrastructure(Hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee, statements by Dr. Peter Pry et al.) congress.gov.

• Bruin Political Review. (2023). How Iran is Reshaping the Sudanese Civil War (Analysis article) bruinpoliticalreview.org

• Wikimedia Commons (2023). First & Second Battles of Fallujah – Photographic archives (Various U.S. Defense Department images and descriptions) orgen.wikipedia.org.

• Department of Defense. (2009–2012). Defense.gov News Photos – Iraq and Afghanistan (Public domain images and captions of U.S. military operations)